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VICTORY IN INDOCHINA! The peoples of 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have at last 
realised the ir dream and burning passion, 
which led them to make incredible sacrifices 
and achieve even more incredible deeds of 
politica l and m ilitary struggle. It is impossible 
to exaggerate either the w orld significance of 
this victory, o rthe  immense human qualities of 
the peoples who defeated and hum iliated the 
w orld ’s m ightiest imperial power.
A fter so much has been w ritten, it is 
unnecessary to repeat the statistics of bombs 
dropped, the unequal strengths of the armies, 
navies and air forces arrayed, or the industrial 
strength and wealth of the two sides. The 
United States, w ith 200 m illion people and the 
consumer of 40 per cent of the w orld ’s 
resources, drew into its aggressive war two 
developed capita list countries - Australia and 
New Zealand. It used Japan's advanced
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technology as a support base, and it levied 
armies from its vassal states in Asia - South 
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines.
Against th is form idable strength, used w ith 
ruthless inhum anity unmatched since the Nazi 
conquest of Europe, the Indochina nations 
could muster only 40 m illion people, basically 
peasant economies, little  industry and no 
advanced weapons technology - except fo r 
those “supplied” by the aggressors. At the 
beginning of the independence war in 1945, 
the Vietnamese had almost no arms. They 
received little  outside m ilitary and econom ic 
aid fo r many years of the ir struggle, firs t 
against France, then the United States. The 
American excuses fo r the ir defeat include as a 
major cause the supply of Soviet, Chinese and 
other socia list countries ’ arms and equipm ent. 
These undoubtedly helped a lot, in the later 
stage of the struggle, but they reached 
substantial proportions only after the struggle 
against US imperialism  began in the south 
w ith no modern war weapons and little  
conventional armament - most of it captured 
from the French and the US.
The Vietnamese never used an air force, 
though the US deployed huge armadas for 
mass bombing, chemical warfare and tactical 
use in battles. The ingenuity, courage and skill 
shown against air war is but one of the many 
m ilitary achievements of the Vietnamese, 
w hich w ill cause m ilitary text-books to be 
rewritten. An agonising reappraisal of m ilitary 
strategy has already begun in the Pentagon 
and other im peria list m ilitary establishments, 
w hich w ill go on fo r years. But it is safe to  say 
that these w ill never really penetrate to the 
essence of the reasons for the US defeat, for 
these are not purely m ilitary.
In Vietnam, the struggle was always seen as 
both m ilita ry and politica l, with po litics playing 
a major part. The struggle was above all a 
people’s war fo r national independence, with 
all the consequences flow ing from this: the 
po litica l struggle against imperialism  and its 
puppet regimes w ith the ir social base in the 
classes which co-operated w ith French and 
American imperialisms. M ilitary strategy and 
tactics flowed from  this politica l strategy, w ith 
each s tage of the  in d e pe n d e n ce  w ar 
p ro d u c in g  d iffe re n t m ilita ry  m e thods . 
G uerrilla war alternating w ith big positional 
battles, returning to guerrilla struggle, all 
d irected by an unmatched politica l strategy 
which had defin ite  aims at all stages.
The US im perialists tried to match this by 
d e v is in g  th e ir  ow n c o u n te r- in s u rg e n c y  
strategy. They called in “experts" from other
countries - B rita in ’s B rigadier Thompson and 
Australia ’s Serong, fo r example. The CIA was 
decisive in the gruesome genocidal planning - 
r e - s e t t le m e n t ,  s t r a t e g i c  h a m le ts ,  
c o n c e n tra tio n  cam ps, m assacres - all 
designed to dry up the sea in which the 
guerrillas swam among the people. This went 
to the crim inal extent of deliberate destruction 
of crops, arable land and forests, to  deny the 
Liberation forces food and shelter. Some US 
scientists have said it may take a century to 
overcome this deliberate destruction of the 
ecology.
No matter what strategy and tactics the US 
devised, whether it was “social eng ineering” to 
d e s tro y  the  p e o p le 's  w il l  to  re s is t by 
resettlement and “education” , o r the use of 
frightfu lness by air raids and wanton killing 
from the air or on the ground as at My Lai, the 
Liberation forces found the answers. This was 
not always easy; W ilfred Burchett has 
described the consternation caused by the 
first use of helicopter gunships at the battle of 
Ap Bac, and how this was overcome.
The Vietnamese won v ictory because the 
Liberation forces worked purposefu lly to 
implement the ir strategic aims, sk ilfu lly  
com bin ing m ilitary and po litica l struggle. 
Western m ilita ry analysts declared the 1968 
Te t o ffe n s ive  a fa ilu re , because the 
Vietnamese had lost so many of the ir m ilitary 
cadre. Yet the Tet offensive shattered the US 
p o s itio n , d e s tro ye d  th e  US m ilita ry  
establishm ent’s nerve, and broke Johnson. It 
began the process of US w ithdrawal fina lly 
forced on the US in January, 1973, though 
many more battles had to be fough t in Vietnam 
and politica l struggles waged in the US and 
th roughout the world before the Americans 
fina lly accepted the inevitable. Even then they 
did so only after a last d isplay of brutal force in 
the mass bombings of the North at Christmas,
1972.
Over two years of com plicated politica l and 
m ilitary s trugg le fo llow ed the  Paris Agreement
- a politica l struggle fo r im plem entation of the 
Agreement, b itterly resisted by Thieu w ith US 
backing, and m ilitary struggle to resist land- 
grabbing by the Thieu regime. When it fina lly 
became obvious that Thieu and the US had no 
in te n tio n  o f im p le m e n tin g  the  Paris 
Agreement, and after repeated warnings, the 
Liberation forces launched the final offensive 
which again com bined m ilita ry and politica l 
struggle w ith uprisings in the cities co ­
ordinated w ith the m ilitary offensive.
The Paris Agreement was a decisive stage in 
the struggle. The Americans, Thieu and their
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supporters in Australia and the w orld now 
claim that the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government frustrated the Agreement. But to 
little avail; Thieu w ould never im plem ent any 
of the main clauses, of the Agreement, 
including setting up the National Council of 
Reconciliation, a coa lition governm ent and 
e le c t io n s .  T h e  f i r m  s t r u g g le  f o r  
implem entation of these provisions was an 
indispensable preparation fo r fina l vie to r y , no 
matter what is said«by some “ le ft” arm chair 
strategists. These also opposed the Paris 
Agreement, particu larly the struggle fo r a 
c o a lit io n  g o ve rn m en t; th e ir  o p p o s it io n  
counted fo r little  and has been swept away by 
history as the irrelevancy it always was.
The Vietnam war was a tu rn ing  point in the 
w orld -h is to ric  struggle which is the essence of 
the present epoch. The final victories in 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos w ill change a lot, 
just as the Vietnam struggle changed so much 
in the world, in the Uriited States and Australia 
not least. Much w ill yet be w ritten, from both 
sides, to analyse the nature and results of th is 
epic struggle. Its im portance is already 
immediately obvious, as US president Ford 
makes a p ilg rim a g e . to Europe to assure 
America's allies that it w ill stick to its 
commitments. W orld imperialism  is at sixes 
and sevens, unsure of the fu tu re , undecided as 
to its strategy, beset by econom ic, politica l 
and social problems in terna lly and globally.
US im perialism 's in tervention in Vietnam 
played a big part in sharpening these 
contradictions. The huge US expenditure - 
S139 billion is adm itted - accelerated the 
decline of the a lm ighty do llar and precipitated 
the world currency crisis. The reckless war of 
aggression hastened the “ resources crisis", 
while the progressive erosion of US power 
cred ib ility  encouraged oil and other producers 
to tackle the im peria list econom ic dom ination 
of world trade. Equally im portant was the way 
that Vietnam polarised po litics in the United 
States, with massive anti-w ar actions and the 
decline of US ru ling class prestige at home and 
abroad. Two US presidents were broken by 
their failures in Vietnam and the ensuing 
challenge to the ahnorality of im perialism , its 
lying, its brutal use of force, its corrup tion  and 
global crimes. If the Vietnamese people had 
not stayed firm  and fought on, the world crisis 
of imperialism would not be nearly so 
advanced.
It m ight be argued that US imperialism  need 
not have made the mistakes it did in Indochina. 
Indeed, even that shopsoiled Metternich, Dr 
Henry Kissinger, has adm itted that Vietnam 
was a mistake - fo r which he is as responsible
as any single individual. But im perialism  is not 
a “ po licy” adopted by a governm ent; it is the 
inescapable result of the social system of 
modern capita lism . Eisenhower justified  the 
firs t US involvement by referring to the rich 
resources of Vietnam - its tin, tungsten and 
other m inerals which should be kept fo r the 
“ Free W orld” . This was long before the 
“ resources c ris is ” hit the world headlines, 
when indeed v irtua lly  no-one thought about it 
as a real problem. Yet im perialism 's inexorable 
need fo r unlim ited econom ic grow th to make 
bigger and bigger p ro fits  led inevitably to a 
constant push to maintain and expand contro l 
over cheap raw materials through an imposed 
unequal trade, and to secure market and 
investment opportun ities.
In this sense, the Vietnamese were in the 
fo re fron t of the Th ird  W orld ’s struggle against 
im p e r ia lis t d o m in a tio n . Far m ore  than 
Vietnam's own resources were involved in this 
gamble. This explains the desperation with 
which the United States stuck to the puppet 
Thieu regime, and Kissinger's “s tra tegy” of 
ensuring a “ decent in terval” before “ a llow ing ” 
a final liberation victory. That th is meant 
extending the figh ting  and piled more 
suffering upon the Vietnamese was immaterial 
to this strategist; people mean nothing, they 
are bu t c ip h e rs  in the  m a th e m a tica l 
calculations of money and power. The ignoble 
spectacle of face-saving has its own crazy 
crim inal logic, too; the stakes were so high that 
even a little  face saved meant a lot to  the 
im p e ria lis t p la n ne rs , s t i l l  h e ll-b e n t on 
m aintaining the ir world position.
Fortunately, the more they strove to save 
face, the more face they lost. The same is true 
of the Mayaguez affair; Ford and K issinger’s 
sordid g loating over the ir “ famous v ic to ry ” is 
already tu rn ing  to ashes as the debits are 
totted up in another reappraisal. However, the 
US and other im perialists are unable to learn 
the real lessons, though they may become 
more skilled at their e fforts to maintain the ir 
contro l. It seems that th is may well become the 
central issue fo r po litica l debate w ith in  the 
im perialist countries. The Ford-K issinger- 
Schlesinger school shows little  sign of 
change, judg ing  by sabre-rattling threats 
against the o il-producers, the threats to North 
Korea and excuses for the Vietnam debacle. 
The latter are ch illing ly  rem iniscent of the 
German generals' excuses fo r defeat in W orld 
War One, which prepared the way fo r Nazism 
and fo r the Second W orld War.
This grim log ic of im peria list dynam ics leads 
to the conclusion that the an ti-im peria list
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struggle must be stepped up, and the post- 
Vietnam situation is favou rab le fo rth is , though 
the possib ility  of an even more desperate 
im peria list policy must be reckoned w ith. The 
s tru g g le  a g a in s t c o n tin u e d  e xpanded  
consum ption of the w orld ’s resources fo r ever­
grow ing profits and a distorted, increasingly 
repellent social life, is a central issue in the 
tigh t against imperialism. That is the politica l 
essence of the figh t against such actions as the 
m ining of Fraser Island and uranium mining, 
as well as so lidarity with all liberation 
movements.
It also raises deep questions of the nature of 
socialist societies fo r which we fight. In this, 
too, Vietnam has an im portant place, as it steps 
out on a course of econom ic advancement so 
vita lly needed. The Vietnamese plan to 
com bine the biological revolution w ith the 
chemical revolution in agricu lture in a way that 
avoids the over-use of chemical fertilisers, and 
it appears that the bicycle and the bus will 
remain the main means of personal transport, 
instead of the car, while trucks and railways 
w ill be the main means of transporting goods. 
These and other plans fo r industria lis ing the 
country are forced by necessity, but they also 
provide a new alternative fo r social advance, 
one in accord w ith world needs.
The struggle for a new world society in 
harmony w ith the total environm ent is 
essentially a struggle against world capita lism  
and its econom ic laws, since it is motivated by 
profit, and econom ic growth fo r this aim, not 
the satisfaction of real human needs. But it 
a lso  needs a rev iew  o f the  h is to r ic a l 
experience of socialist industria lisation, in 
which the experience of the Asian countries - 
China and Korea as well as Vietnam - could 
give new insights.
it is arguable that the US waged the Vietnam 
war w ith such desperate ferocitv precisely to 
maintain its im peria list position in Asia and the 
world - a position vital to assure US capita list 
contro l of resources, markets and investment. 
Vietnam became the test case fo r US imperial 
power; its defeat was crucial in tu rn ing the 
tide. No other event since the victory of the 
Chinese Revolution in 1949 so alters the world 
b a lance  o f fo rce s . The p ro b le m  fo r  
revolutionaries is how to press home this 
advantage, how to advance the forces fo r 
revolution everywhere to make the decisive 
change so urgent fo r a world being brought 
close to the edge of disaster by im perialist 
dom ination of at least tw o-th irds of the world 
economy.
The Communist Party of Australia has 
expressed the view tha t the Vietnamese 
Workers' Party played a great role in 
upholding the banner of Com m unism  and 
internationalism , when the movement was 
beset w ith serious divisions which reduced its 
attractive power and its strength. The 
Vietnamese were able to draw support from 
both sides of this conflic t, and maintain a 
semblance of unity in relation to the ir struggle. 
It is to be hoped that the favourable 
perspectives flow ing from  the Indochina 
victory may influence an improvem ent in the 
relations between the Soviet Union and China, 
though there are many in tractable problems in 
the way.
This is very important, since imperialism 
hopes to use the divisions, as indeed it used 
them during a crucial stage of the Indochina 
struggle (as in N ixon ’s "detente” visits to 
Peking and Moscow). Thrashing around for 
some leverage in international politics, 
Kissinger has stressed the need fo r detente 
and has clearly implied threats if th is does not 
help the US in its present cris is This was the 
point of K issinger’s statem ent deploring the 
"w illingness of the Soviet Union to explo it 
strategic opportunities, even though some of 
these opportunities present themselves more 
or less spontaneously, and not as a result of 
the Soviet Union .... (this) constitu tes a heavy 
mortgage on detente.”
One of the major lessons of the Vietnam 
struggle is that determ ination in struggle is 
vital; as Ho Chi Minh put it, “nothing is more 
precious than independence and freedom ” 
(emphasis added). U nderlin ing th is is the well- 
known Vietnamese statement that "detente is 
relative; struggle is absolute."
O pposition leader Malcolm Fraser has taken 
up the theme of utilis ing differences between 
the Soviet Union and China, as he urges a 
hardline course in foreign po licy  and a big 
expansion of Australian m ilita ry power in the 
aftermath of the im peria list debacle in 
Indochina. Nowhere else in the capita list 
world has there been such dismay and 
disarray in reactionary circles as in Australia. 
The Libera l-Country opposition cannot divest 
itself of its Pavlovian reflex to the alleged 
threat of the “southward th rust of Asian 
Communism". It would be an interesting 
e xe rc ise  in p s y c h o lo g y  to  a tte m p t to  
disentangle the strands which are knotted in 
this syndrom e - to discover just how much is 
concerned w ith internal politics, how much 
w ith a gut racist reaction to Asia, and how 
much is genuine belief that the Asian hordes
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really look w ith envious eyes at Austra lia ’s 
‘empty spaces” and rich resources. Suffice it 
to say that Fraser and Co. have learnt nothing 
and forgotten noth ing from the ir quarter- 
century of ty ing Australia to  US policy, 
particu larly in Asia, as the only way to 
A u s tra lia n  s e c u r ity  th ro u g h  the  Pax 
Americana w hich they saw as lasting fo r the 
whole 20th century and beyond.
Now that it has obviously ended, they cling 
to it, but w ith the nagging fear that the US 
cannot be depended upon. Therefore, they 
reason, Australia must be strong m ilitarily . Not 
really fo r defence, though; it needs strength 
to back up a fore ign policy which is designed 
to defend the dom inoes it sees as fa lling. This 
is most openly stated by the papers owned by 
Sir Warwick Fairfax, who "eems to have gone 
off his brain fo llow ing th-a liberation victories 
in Indochina.
The Sydney Morning Herald carried 19 
editoria ls warning of doom after Vietnam in the 
44 editions from April 3 to  May 24 this year. Its 
April 3 editorial “ Sowing the w ind" warned of 
“ the progressive collapse of the land barriers 
which have h itherto separated us from  the 
States and from a politica l system implacably 
dedicated to the destruction of the freedoms 
we take for granted.” Referring to people “ like 
Dr Cairns and Mr Uren” , we are to ld “ When we 
reap the w hirlw ind h istory w ill not have far to 
look fo r its gu ilty  men.” Somewhat strident - 
but only the beginning. More and more 
hysterically, the Herald ranted about the world 
situation after Vietnam and the W hitlam 
governm ent’s betrayal of Australia. It is 
instructive to re-read these editoria ls, feature 
articles and news reporting, as Sir Warwick's 
journalists piled horror on horror, menace 
upon menace. Orphans, refugees, bloodbaths, 
massacres fo llowed day after day.
On April 22, we read tha t “The accounts 
reaching Saigon of mass executions and 
atrocities being com m itted by the victorious 
comm unists ... are grow ing in volume and 
horror ... Ithas been suggested,fina lly, tha tthe  
horrors ... w ill cease w ith peace ... it is crystal 
clear it is not going to happen after Saigon falls 
or surrenders." The surrender came only eight 
days later; already a month has passed and 
even the most avid sensation-m onger has not 
been able to find anything even remotely 
resembling reprisals, let alone the predicted 
“seven m illion to be purged” .
Quite contrary to the rightw ing predictions 
the Provisional Revolutionary Government is 
deliberately w orking to prevent reprisals, w ith
the same farsighted politica l vision it has 
displayed through the long struggle. Its aim 
now is to prevent any fu rther divisions, to  heal 
the wounds of war and to draw in all possible 
forces in rebuild ing the country. These include 
those trained in technical and adm inistrative 
skills by the Americans. This policy of mercy 
and reconcilia tion contrasts sharply w ith the 
ruthless te rro r of the Thieu adm inistration; it is 
perhaps helped by the fligh t of the war 
crim inals from Thieu downwards, who carried 
their anti-popular crimes through to the end by 
decamping w ith all the gold, art treasures and 
anything else they could lay the ir hands on 
and get the Americans to transport for them.
All the hoo-ha about orphans, refugees and 
bloodbaths was always bound to be only a 
nine-days wonder, but what lies behind it has 
to be taken seriously. The rightw ing forces are 
deadly serious in the ir intention to pursue a 
hardline pro-im peria list policy, to increase the 
armed forces and spend a lot more money on 
“defence” . The Sydney Morning Herald is 
again the pacemaker fo r the right. In its April 
19 editoria l attacking the governm ent’s 
defence policy, it asserts that "... Mr Barnard 
shows only the most prim itive appreciation of 
what defence forces are maintained fo r and 
totally fails to  recognise that they represent an 
integral factor of foreign policy.” (emphasis 
added). This fits  in very well w ith O pposition 
spokesm an P e a co ck ’s ta lk  a b o u t the 
possib ility  of fu ture V ietnam-type situations, 
foreshadowing possible interventions. This is 
a policy of madness, as is the Herald’s naive 
belief that Australia could influence Asia by 
build ing a massive strike force - a task far 
beyond its capacity in any case.
It remains to analyse the Whitlam foreign 
policy in relation to Vietnam and the new 
situation. As d is tinct from people like Dr 
Cairns and Tom Uren, so execrated by the 
Herald, Mr Whitlam has always been equivocal 
on Vietnam. He was never happy w ith even 
Calwell’s conditiona l opposition to the war; as 
late as 1968 he was praising the shift in US 
m ilitary po licy to win the war through a “clear 
and ho ld” strategy. He was positively unhappy 
at public m inisterial critic ism  of N ixon’s last 
crim inal bombings. He opposed recognition of 
the PRG at Terrigal, though this was the last 
opportun ity  to lend Austra lia ’s w eight to  an 
earlier and easier peace. It needs to be clearly 
understood that Labor’s foreign policy is 
W hitlam ’s; th is explains why he feels so 
unjustly accused by the O pposition of 
supporting the Vietnamese.
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W hitlam to the end did his best to assist the 
United States on Vietnam, though w ith a 
seeming independence. In the new situation, 
w ith Austra lia  recognising the PRG only when 
it had won, it is vital to  mount a big campaign to 
force urgently needed aid on a large scale, not 
a llow ing it to be lost in W hitlam 's generalised 
call fo r an in ternational effort, desirable as this 
is.
The broader questions of Australia 's post- 
Vietnam fore ign policy need serious thought 
and action. Whitlam still pins his foreign po licy 
on the US alliance, ANZUS and all the 
paraphenalia of the past. V isiting Ford in 
W ashington, he expressed his faith in the 
United States and its w orld role. In practical 
terms, th is has already led to agreem ent for 
the Omega base, allegedly never to be used in 
nuclear war but largely pointless w ithout such 
planned use.
The Whitlam foreign po licy has other 
intersections w ith US plans, notably Ford's 
“ line-draw ing” in Asia - w ith particu la r 
reference to support fo r Suharto’s corrup t 
Indonesian regime. As we have said before, 
the Whitlam foreign policy is essentially an 
alternative cap ita lis t policy, more realistic in 
that it seeks to pro ject an image of a more 
independent ally of the United States and a 
less racist, therefore more acceptable “ friend" 
of the nations of Asia, A frica and Latin 
America.
The left should figh t for a genuinely non- 
aligned fore ign policy, whose a lignm ent 
supports national liberation and is therefore 
anti-im peria list. The struggle fo r such a po licy 
w ill assume greater and greater significance, 
in dom estic po licy as well as foreign affairs, 
since US and internal reactionary pressure will 
increase fo r higher arms spending, expanding 
contro l and use of resources etc.
A key to this figh t is active refutation of the 
big lie of “ Vietnamese expansionism ” , so 
assiduously pushed by people like Denis 
Warner. Shattered by the US defeat in Vietnam 
and the collapse of his predictions, this hired 
pen keeps returning to the theme of the 
Vietnamese pledge to “ make a worthy 
contribu tion  to the w orld revo lu tion .” He 
represents th is as threatened aggression, 
whereas the w orthy con tribu tion  fo llow ing its 
tremendous help by defeating US imperialism  
is precisely to unify and build up an 
independent, prosperous and happy Vietnam.
No matter how they tw ist and squirm, 
reactionaries can never make Vietnam a case 
of export of revolution. If ever there was a 
genuinely indigenous, independent and self- 
reliant revolution, it was this one, symbolised 
by Ho Chi Minh and his unique com bination of 
internationalism  and patriotism . The essence 
of Vietnam was the utter defeat of the export of 
counter-revolution in its most massive-ever 
attempt. This is the lesson of Vietnam, already 
influencing all nationa l-liberation movements; 
this is its main influence upon w orld history.
There are lessons fo r all revolutionaries, too, 
not only fo r those who must wage an armed 
national liberation struggle. One of the most 
im portant of these is the need to find a correct 
strategy through deep analysis of the nature of 
the society one sets out to change, the class 
forces involved and the internal and external 
, contradictions which help the revolution. 
Another is the need to stick firm ly  to princip le 
and figh t w ith determ ination and flex ib ility  for 
the strategy, neither ignoring aid and advice 
nor sacrific ing independence. Still another is 
the great im portance of build ing a united 
revolutionary party to serve the mass struggle, 
not replace it.
